Organizations in Changing Environments: The Case of East German Symphony Orchestras by Hackman, J. & Allmendinger, Jutta
 
Organizations in Changing Environments: The Case of East
German Symphony Orchestras
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Allmendinger, Jutta, and J. Richard Hackman. 1996.
Organizations in changing environments: the case of East
German symphony orchestras. Administrative Science Quarterly
41, no. 3: 337-369.
Published Version doi:10.2307/2393935
Accessed February 17, 2015 9:50:08 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3168791
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAOrganizations in Changing Environments: The Case of East German Symphony Orchestras
Author(s): Jutta Allmendinger and J. Richard Hackman
Source: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 337-369
Published by: Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2393935
Accessed: 06/07/2009 05:28
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cjohn.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to Administrative Science Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.orgOrganizations  in 
Changing 
Environments:  The 
Case of East German 
Symphony Orchestras 
Jutta Allmendinger 
Munich  University 
J. Richard Hackman 
Harvard  University 
? 
1996 by Cornell  University. 
0001  -8392/96/41  03-0337/$1  .00. 
0 
Portions  of the research  reported  here 
were supported  by the Max Planck 
Institute  for Bildungsforschung  and by 
the Harvard  Graduate  School  of Business 
Administration.  We thank  Larissa 
Kowal-Wolk,  Erin  Lehman,  and Rebecca 
Roters  for their  collaboration  on the 
project;  Jay Tucker  for help in translating 
and coding research  materials;  and Ben 
Dattner,  Adam  Galinsky,  and Tuck 
Pescosolido  for assistance in library 
research  and data analysis.  Helpful 
comments on this paper  were provided 
by Judith  Blau,  Hannah  Bruckner, 
Thomas Ertman,  Paul  DiMaggio,  Connie 
Gersick,  Stephan  Liebfried,  Andy 
Molinsky,  Francie  Ostrower,  Charles 
Perrow,  Klaus  JOrgen  Peter, and Aage 
Sorensen. Assistance in enumerating  the 
population  of orchestras  and in gaining 
access to those selected for the research 
was provided  by the American  Federation 
of Musicians  (AFM),  the American 
Symphony  Orchestra  League  (ASOL),  the 
Arts Council  of Great  Britain  (ACGB),  the 
European  Conference  of Symphony 
Orchestras  (ECSO),  the International 
Conference  of Symphony  and Opera 
Musicians  (ICSOM),  and the Regional 
Orchestra  Players  Association  (ROPA). 
We give special thanks  to Kenneth  Baird 
(ACGB),  Brad  Buckley  (ICSOM), 
Rosemary  Estes (ROPA),  Catherine 
French  (ASOL),  Ken  Haas (Boston 
Symphony  Orchestra),  and Lew Waldeck 
(AFM). 
Two periods of radical political-economic change  in the 
former East Germany illuminate dynamics of 
organization-environment relationships that generally are 
hidden from view. Historical,  qualitative, and survey data 
from a longitudinal comparative study of 78 orchestras in 
four nations show that the contexts of East German 
orchestras changed significantly when the socialist 
regime took power after World War 11,  and then again in 
1990 when that regime fell. Socialist rule only modestly 
affected orchestras' institutional features, however; they 
continued to reflect centuries-old German musical 
traditions. The collapse of socialism  in 1990, by contrast, 
provoked differentiation among orchestras-some 
adapted successfully to the new political-economic 
context, but others floundered. Successful  adaptation 
was found to be a joint function of an orchestra's prior 
strength as an organization and the kinds of leadership 
initiatives taken by orchestra leaders and players. 
Overall, the findings suggest  that the size and character 
of environmental effects depend on the degree to which 
contextual changes  alter (a) the strength of the link 
between organizational actions and resources obtained 
(resource contingency) and (b) organizations' latitude to 
manage their own affairs (operational autonomy). 
In  the decades since Stinchcombe's (1965) landmark 
statements on the relationship  between organizations  and 
their societal contexts, an abundant  research and theoretical 
literature  on organization-environment  relationships  has 
developed. In  this paper,  we take a fresh look at those 
relations  in historically  unique  circumstances-specifically, 
during  the two periods of radical  political-economic  change 
that occurred  in the former  East Germany  in the last 
half-century.  The first change took place in the years 
immediately  after World  War 11  when the socialist regime 
took power; the second occurred  in 1990 when that regime 
fell and the German  states reunified.  Our  focal institution  is 
the professional  symphony  orchestra,  which has been 
integral  to East German  culture  for over a century. By 
examining  the impact  of the two revolutionary  changes on 
this deeply rooted cultural  institution,  we seek to identify 
and illuminate  dynamics  of organization-environment 
relationships  that generally  are hidden  from scholarly  view. 
There is no dearth  of conceptual models of organization- 
environment  relations  (for  a brief review, see  Allmendinger 
and Hackman,  1994). Institutional  models (Meyer  and 
Rowan, 1977; Zucker,  1977; DiMaggio  and Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 1987) describe the processes by which organizations 
situated in similar  environments  tend to become isomorphic 
with those environments,  increasingly  similar  to one another, 
and persistent over time. Population  ecology models 
(Hannan  and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Aldrich,  1979) explain 
how environmental  changes reshape the population  of 
organizations  in a domain. Over  time, organizations  that fit 
well with their environments  prosper  and reproduce, 
whereas those that do not eventually  die out. In  the 
population  ecology view, there is little  that organizational 
actors can do to alter ecological forces or to adapt to them. 
Adaptation  models, such as organization-environment  fit 
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resource dependency theory (Salancik  and Pfeffer, 1977; 
Pfeffer  and Salancik,  1978), and models of organizational 
responses to threat  and failure  (Staw, Sandelands,  and 
Dutton, 1981; Meyer, 1982; Haveman,  1992; Ocasio, 1995), 
derive from a conception of organizations  as rational  actors 
(Barnard,  1938; Child,  1972). Although  adaptation  models 
vary in the strength of their presumption  of managerial 
rationality-in  their  view of organizational  action as 
instrumental  or mainly  symbolic and in their relative  focus on 
actions that are internally  or externally  oriented-a  common 
theme in these models is that leaders can do constructive 
things to help their organizations  respond appropriately  to 
environmental  changes. 
All  of these approaches  can provide  useful explanations  of 
organization-environment  relationships.  Despite the fact that 
they sometimes generate incompatible  predictions,  and 
despite the occasional attempts by scholars to pit them 
against one another  (Singh,  House, and Tucker,  1986; 
Zucker,  1987: 457-459; Astley and Van de Ven, 1983), they 
are not directly  competing theories (Hambrick  and 
Finkelstein,  1987: 370). We view them, instead, as likely  to 
be differentially  useful in explaining  organization-environment 
relations  in different  historical  and organizational 
circumstances.  As Gersick  (1994: 11) noted, now may be 
the time to cease asking whether or not organizations  adapt 
or managerial  choices matter  and to focus instead on "when 
and how organizations  steer successfully through  changing 
environments"  (emphasis added). 
The overall  aim of the present study is to identify  the times 
and circumstances under  which significant  environmental 
changes engender institutional  dynamics or ecological 
processes or adaptive  initiatives  by affected organizations. 
We draw on quantitative,  observational,  archival,  and 
interview  data about professional  symphony orchestras in 
the former  East Germany-supplemented by parallel  data 
from orchestras in the former  West Germany,  the United 
Kingdom,  and the United  States-to  do this. 
Symphony  orchestras in East Germany  provide  a uniquely 
appropriate  setting for this analysis because they 
experienced in this century  two episodes of radical  societal 
change-both  well defined but invoking  opposite social 
policies-separated  by a long intervening  period  of relative 
social stability.  The experience of East German  orchestras 
between 1945 and 1990 has many of the features of a 
naturally  occurring  experiment.  State central  control  was 
introduced  after 1945, allowed to run  for over 40 years, and 
then abruptly  dismantled  in 1990. There are, moreover, 
several nonequivalent  control  groups available  for use in 
interpreting  findings  from East German  orchestras-those  in 
West Germany,  which have the same musical tradition  as 
orchestras in East Germany  but, after 1945, a sharply 
different  political-economic  context; and those in other 
Western nations,  which share with East German  orchestras 
neither  musical  tradition  nor political-economic  context. 
Research Focus 
We approach  our overall  research agenda of identifying  the 
kinds  of processes set in motion by significant 
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environmental  change by first disaggregating  the problem 
into three more specific and empirically  tractable  queries. 
Then, after we have reported  what our data have to say 
about these questions, we integrate  the findings into a new 
conceptual  framework  for analyzing  how organizations 
respond to changing  environments. 
1. Did regulatory agencies  and/or local governments  buffer East 
German orchestras from the impact of national political and 
economic changes? 
That  major  political-economic  changes occurred  in Germany 
after World  War 11  and again in 1990 is evident in the 
historical  record.  It does not necessarily follow, however, 
that those national-level  jolts were felt with full force by East 
German  symphony  orchestras.  Any national  regime 
necessarily implements its social and economic policies 
through  a variety  of administrative  and regulatory  agencies, 
which form the proximal  context of operating  organizations 
(Carroll,  Delacroix,  and Goodstein, 1988). It is possible for 
these agencies to absorb  the impact  of even radical 
national-level  changes, leaving  the proximal  environment  of 
regulated  organizations  mostly unchanged (Aldrich,  1979: 
196). We draw on qualitative  and historical  data to determine 
whether the proximal  environment  of East German 
orchestras  actually  did change after 1945 or in 1990-or 
whether mid-range  government entities blunted  or redirected 
national  policies in ways that preserved orchestras' 
traditional  operating  environments. 
2. To what extent, and in what ways, did orchestral functioning 
and the life and work of orchestra players change in response 
to the two national-level political-economic changes? 
Symphony  orchestras in East Germany  are strong and 
deeply rooted cultural  institutions.  Even if their proximal 
environments  were altered by the two rounds  of 
political-economic  changes in that country,  institutional 
forces might have been strong enough for orchestras to 
weather the changes. If so, we would expect to find 
orchestras persisting  in their  traditional  ways of operating 
and few changes in the life and work of orchestra players 
following  the societal-level  shocks. Alternatively,  the societal 
changes may have been strong and pervasive enough to 
overcome inertial  forces and recast the very institutional 
form of the East German  symphony orchestra.  We draw on 
quantitative  data from orchestras and players  to assess 
empirically  what happens when radical  political-economic 
changes collide  with strong institutional  forces. 
3. What factors distinguish those orchestras that adapted 
successfully to the potentially threatening political-economic 
changes in East Germany from those that did not? 
A changing  external  environment  always offers the 
possibility  of adaptation  in which opportunities  for 
improvement  are exploited  or, at least, potential  negative 
consequences of the changes are avoided. Some orchestras 
in East Germany  fared better after the dismantling  of the 
socialist state in 1990 than did others. We draw on both 
quantitative  and qualitative  data to distinguish  between 
these two groups of orchestras. Specifically,  we empirically 
explore  the possibility  that successful adaptation  depends 
jointly  on (a)  an organization's  strength prior  to the 
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taken by organization  managers and members. 
Trustworthy  answers to these three research questions 
would contribute  to sociological  knowledge about cultural 
institutions  as well as to organization  theory. Although  there 
has been considerable  research on how cultural  traditions 
and political-economic  factors affect public  support  for 
cultural  institutions  (Blau,  1988, 1989), less is known about 
contextual  influences on the organizations  that actually 
produce  cultural  products. Because of the extraordinary 
variation  in the societal context of East German  orchestras 
over the last four decades, East Germany  offers a unique 
setting for assessing factors that affect the viability  of 
cultural  organizations.  Moreover,  because symphony 
orchestras, relative  to other cultural  institutions,  tend to be 
insulated  from direct political  and ideological  influence 
(Shostakovich,  1983), any findings  of effects from political 
changes are likely  to be conservative. Rueschemeyer's 
(1991) research  on East German  visual arts and Goldfarb's 
(1980) study of Polish  student theater supplement the 
results reported  here by providing  tests of the relation 
between political  systems and more politically  sensitive 
cultural  forms. 
Research Setting and Strategy 
Symphony orchestras. Professional  symphony orchestras 
are defined as ensembles whose primary  mission is public 
performance  of those orchestral  works generally  considered 
to fall  within  the standard  symphonic repertoire  and whose 
members are compensated nontrivially  for their services. 
Both concert and broadcast  orchestras fall within our 
domain,  as do orchestras  that perform  specialized works 
such as operas or pops programs  in addition  to the standard 
repertoire.  Excluded  are chamber  ensembles, orchestras that 
perform  operatic  or theater works exclusively, university 
orchestras,  and amateur  orchestras. 
The core task of symphony  orchestras is well defined and 
similar  both within  and across nations, in that symphony 
orchestras around  the world play largely  the same repertoire 
with roughly  the same number  and mix of players. By 
including  in our domain  only orchestras that perform  the 
standard  symphonic  repertoire,  most task-based variance  is 
automatically  controlled.  This reduces the problem,  common 
in comparative  research,  that differences in tasks or 
compositionR  are confounded  with organizational  or national 
contexts. 
German orchestras. Orchestral  music in Germany  has 
received much public  attention  and consistent financial 
support  over the last 200 years (Pfannkuch,  1962; Weineck, 
1985). In  the eighteenth century,  orchestras  were supported 
mainly  by the nobility;  by the twentieth century, almost all 
funding  was provided  by states and municipalities  (Becker, 
1962; Raynor,  1978), supplemented by limited  federal funds 
and occasional private  donations  for special projects. The 
state also was the dominant  provider  of musical training, 
with music schools and conservatories  spread throughout 
the land.  The state-centered support  for music in Germany 
contrasts sharply  with the situation  in the other two 
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countries in our sample. During  the period  addressed in our 
research (1945-1991), most symphony orchestras in the 
United Kingdom  and almost all orchestras in the United 
States were freestanding  entities, subject to the vagaries of 
market  forces and private  philanthropy  (DiMaggio  and 
Useem, 1983: 200; Martorella,  1983: 282). 
Churches  also played  an important  role in promoting  musical 
culture  in Germany  by supplementing  state-provided  musical 
training,  encouraging  the composition  of new works, and 
supplying  regular  audiences for performances.  With 
sustained government support,  widespread opportunities  for 
musical  training,  a continuous  flow of new compositions, 
and numerous performance  venues, symphonic music 
became part  of the cultural  fabric  of the land. People from all 
strata  of German  society, not just the elite, were familiar 
with symphonic music and accustomed to hearing  it 
routinely  in their own communities. 
This pattern  persisted through  many periods of political  and 
economic turbulence,  including  even the Nazi regime 
(Prieberg,  1982). The pattern  changed abruptly  in 1945, 
however, when Germany  was partitioned,  and each nation 
began to go its own way. That  musical culture  continued to 
be important  to both German  states in the ensuing historical 
period  is not in question. The question, instead, is to what 
extent-and  in what ways-East  German  orchestras and 
their proximal  contexts changed after 1945 and then again in 
the late 1980s. 
Analytic strategy. Archival,  interview,  observational,  and 
survey data about orchestras and their contexts were 
collected in 1990 and 1991 as part  of a comparative  study of 
78 symphony  orchestras in four nations. We rely on different 
subsets of those data for each of our three research 
questions. 
For  the first question, on the degree to which mid-range 
government  entities buffered  orchestras from the full impact 
of societal-level  changes, we draw mainly  on archival  and 
interview  data. We document changes in the immediate 
context of East German  orchestras that resulted from the 
advent of the socialist regime following  World  War 11  and 
those that occurred  as the events leading  to German 
reunification  began to unfold  in the late 1980s. 
For  the second question, on how orchestras and players 
responded  to the societal-level  changes, we rely on survey 
and interview  data. To assess  the impact of socialism, we 
draw mainly  on survey data collected from members of 
orchestras in the four countries in our sample as the 
communist era came to an end in early 1990. If four 
decades of socialist policies and practices had significantly 
affected East German  orchestras, then the reports  of players 
in those orchestras should differ  substantially  both from 
those of their counterparts  in West German  orchestras 
(which,  during  the same historical  period,  operated in a 
democracy  that became increasingly  market-oriented)  and 
from those of musicians in the two English-speaking  nations. 
To assess  the impact  of the second major  political-economic 
change, we collected an additional  wave of survey data in 
the summer of 1991, after the socialist regime had fallen. 
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second change on orchestras and players. 
For  the third  question, about the factors that distinguish 
orchestras  that prospered  under reunification  from those that 
began to flounder,  we rely  on survey, interview,  and 
observational  data. These data identify  certain  structural 
features of orchestras  and patterns  of behavior  by orchestra 
leaders and members that moderated  the impact of 
reunification  on orchestras and players.  Throughout,  we give 
special attention  to mechanisms that cross levels of 
analysis-particularly  to the interactions  among (a) contextual 
factors (the two political-economic  shocks and government 
policies and practices),  (b)  organization-level  variables 
(structural  features of orchestras),  and (c) the behavior  and 
attitudes of individual  players  and leaders. 
METHOD 
Selection of Orchestras 
The population  of symphony  orchestras in each of the four 
countries  was enumerated by listing  all orchestras that 
advertised  at least one open player  position between 1985 
and 1989. We obtained  the 1989 player  salary  budget for 
each of those orchestras and used the distribution  of salary 
budgets to select approximately  equal numbers of "major" 
and "regional"  orchestras from each country.  Major 
orchestras  were randomly  drawn  from the top decile (or, in 
the United Kingdom,  which had relatively  fewer orchestras, 
quintile)  of the distribution;  regional  orchestras were 
randomly  drawn  from each of the remaining  deciles (or 
quintiles)  until  we obtained  a sample of about 20 orchestras 
from each country.  Of the 81 orchestras invited  to 
participate  in the study, 78 agreed (96 percent). One regional 
orchestra  in the United  States and one major  and one 
regional  orchestra  in the United Kingdom  declined. 
Characteristics  of the orchestras in the sample are 
summarized  in Table 1. A number  of differences across 
nation  and orchestra  standing (major  vs. regional)  are 
evident. Only  in the United  States do all orchestras perform 
concerts exclusively.  The United Kingdom  and the two 
German  nations have several orchestras whose  main 
mission is broadcast  performances.  Only half of the German 
orchestras perform  concerts exclusively; many also perform 
for opera and theater productions.  As might be expected, 
given their multiple  missions, the mean size of German 
orchestras is larger  than that of orchestras in the two 
English-speaking  countries. Regional  orchestras in all 
countries  tend to be more recently  founded than major 
orchestras,  to have a larger  percentage of women players 
(especially  in the United  States and the United Kingdom), 
and (for East and West Germany  only)  to have a larger 
percentage of foreign  workers. There are no major 
differences across nations in player  demographics. 
Qualitative and Archival Data 
Before beginning  fieldwork,  we studied published 
information  such as orchestra  histories, scholarly  papers, and 
newspaper or magazine  articles  about orchestras in each 
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Table 1 
Characteristics  of Orchestras  by Country  and Standing 
East Germany  West  Germany  United  States  United  Kingdom 
Characteristic  Major  Regional  Major  Regional  Major  Regional  Major  Regional 
Number of orchestras  in sample  9  13  12  8  13  11  7  5 
Concerts  exclusively  5  6  4  5  13  11  6  2 
Opera and/or theater  2  7  3  3  0  0  0  0 
Broadcast  2  0  5  0  0  0  1  3 
Mean orchestra  size  133  67  121  71  101  79  93  76 
Mean date founded  1818  1867  1920  1917  1904  1943  1904  1931 
Orchestra composition 
Mean  percent women  players  11  23  11  23  25  47  24  39 
Mean percent  foreign players  1  20  21  42  3  1  4  3 
Player demographics  (means) 
Age  42.0  40.0  41.0  37.0  44.0  35.0  37.0  38.0 
Years in orchestra  6.9  6.1  6.0  5.6  6.1  5.1  5.2  5.3 
Years in position  6.6  5.7  5.9  5.4  5.6  4.6  4.9  5.0 
Number of previous orchestras  1.9  2.0  2.2  2.0  2.3  3.0  1.9  2.0 
country. We then visited each  of the 78  orchestras  in the 
sample  to conduct  interviews,  make observations,  and 
obtain archival data (concert programs, rosters of players and 
managers,  financial data, and concert  attendance  figures) for 
1985-1990.  Interviewees  included orchestra  managers, 
officials of governing boards or agencies,  players, and 
support staff. When  possible,  we  also observed  rehearsals 
and concerts.  We summarized and coded  archival, interview, 
and observational data on a recording form designed  to 
maximize the comparability of data across  orchestras  and 
countries  (for details, see  Allmendinger et al., 1993). 
Data about the social and regulatory context  of East German 
orchestras  were  obtained primarily  from interviews  with 
officials of the government  agency  responsible  for theaters 
and orchestras  (the Direktion fOr  Theater und Orchester,  or 
DTO) and with the spokesman  for the  acting East German 
Minister of Culture, and from the official press  organ Theater 
der Zeit from 1960 through 1989,  the  occasional  publication 
Decisions  and Announcements  of the Ministry of Culture, 
and the  East German collective  contract for artists.  Detailed 
information about specific  orchestras  was  taken from the 
annual Ensembles  der Deutschen  Demokratischen  Republik 
from 1985 to  1990 and from several  editions  of Information, 
published by the  DTO. 
Archival data supplied by East German orchestras  presented 
some  special  interpretive challenges.  Budgets,  a managerial 
staple  in Western  orchestras,  were  not used  by (or, in some 
cases,  even  available to) most  East German orchestra 
managers.  Attendance  data were  of questionable  reliability 
because  of political requirements that concert  halls be full, 
and even  seemingly  straightforward historical data, such  as 
lists of former conductors,  could not be taken at face  value. 
Also, because  smaller orchestras  often  exchanged 
musicians,  their  official  rosters  sometimes  did  not  provide 
complete data about who actually  played in them. Despite 
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managers,  and public  officials  was exemplary.  No orchestra 
declined to participate,  no one we sought to interview 
turned us away, and the survey return  rate was higher in 
East Germany  than in any other country. 
Survey Data 
To tap players'  views of their orchestras,  we developed and 
administered  a survey to a subset of players  of each 
orchestra.  The survey, which consisted of 87 items 
distributed  across six sections, was based on previous 
research  by one of the authors  (Hackman,  1990), 
supplemented by observations  and interviews at a subset of 
orchestras in the present sample. It assessed  players' 
perceptions  of the organizational  features of their orchestras, 
within-orchestra  interpersonal  processes, and the behaviors 
of orchestra  leaders. In  addition,  the survey asked about 
each respondent's own work motivation,  satisfaction, and 
career history.  Originally  drafted  in English,  the survey was 
translated  into German  and partially  back-translated  by 
bilingual  members of the research  team. 
The survey was administered  to a stratified  random  sample 
of 15 players  in each orchestra:  two first violins, two second 
violins,  one viola, one cello, one bass, two woodwinds, two 
brass, one percussion, and three principal  players (one each 
from the strings, woodwinds, and brass/percussion).  Six 
orchestras  did not participate  in the survey portion  of the 
research:  two major  and two regional  orchestras in West 
Germany  and one major  and one regional  orchestra in the 
United  States. After  the first round  of surveys had been 
returned,  we sent additional  surveys to most orchestras. The 
same sampling  plan  was used in the second round,  except 
that women were deliberately  oversampled  to permit 
comparative  analyses of the responses of male and female 
players  (see Allmendinger  and Hackman,  1995). 
Surveys were anonymous, although  they did identify  the 
respondent's orchestra,  section, and status as a principal  or 
tutti player.  Total  sample size for the main analyses reported 
in this paper is 72 orchestras  and 992 respondents. The 
number  of orchestras, number  of respondents, and response 
rates for each country  are as follows: East Germany:  22 
orchestras, 357 respondents (59 percent);  West Germany: 
20 orchestras, 186 respondents (45 percent); United States: 
24 orchestras, 290 respondents (52 percent); United 
Kingdom:  12 orchestras, 159 respondents (51 percent). 
We derived  sixteen composite measures from the survey 
items. These were based on the a priori  framework  used to 
select and generate items, supplemented by factor analyses 
of data from 924 respondents and by inspections of item 
means, standard  deviations,  and intercorrelations.  We 
retained  five single items of special interest, resulting  in a 
total of 21 measures. They are grouped into four domains: 
(a) organizational  features of the orchestra, (b)  orchestral 
process and performance,  (c) player  motivation  and 
satisfaction,  and (d) music director  behavior.  All measures 
range  from 1 (low)  to 7 (high),  except for those assessing 
the behavior  of the music director,  which range from 1 to 5. 
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Table  2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Measures* 
Measure  Items  Mean  S.D.  Reliability 
Organizational  features of the orchestra 
Integrity  as an ensemble  8  5.05  1.00  .73 
Orchestra  structure:  Task  and composition  5  4.86  1.03  .65 
Player  involvement  and opportunities  8  4.10  1.11  .76 
Adequacyof resources  2  4.20  1.81  .59 
Single items: 
Recognition  (Excellent  playing  pays off)  5.50  1.51 
Recruitment  (Fair  and effective)  5.28  1.60 
Orchestral  process and performance 
Quality  of internal  processes  7  4.76  1.03  .78 
Musical  outcomes  3  4.81  1.25  .70 
Single items: 
Finances  (Getting  stronger  financially)  3.35  1.84 
Stability  (Organization  not falling  apart)  5.92  1.54 
Player  motivation  and satisfaction 
General  satisfaction  3  5.61  1.21  .74 
Internal  work motivation  3  6.21  0.79  .69 
Job involvement  1  4.70  2.04 
Satisfaction  with: 
Compensation  2  3.87  1.75  .73 
Job security  2  4.82  1.48  .88 
Management  3  4.28  1.48  .86 
Work  relationships  3  4.93  0.98  .58 
Growth  opportunities  4  4.84  1.17  .79 
Behavior  of the music director 
Direction-setting  5  3.67  1.09  .92 
Organizational  initiatives  7  3.15  0.98  .84 
Coaching  5  2.82  0.90  .79 
* Based on respondents  from all countries.  Number  of responses ranges  from 886 to 924. 
The measures, grouped by domain,  are described in the 
Appendix.  Means, standard  deviations,  and internal 
consistency reliabilities  are reported  in Table 2. We assessed 
discriminant  validities  of the measures by comparing  the 
average intercorrelation  among items that make up a given 
composite score with those items in the same section of 
the survey that do not contribute  to that score (off-diagonal 
correlations).  The median  within-composite  correlation  is .46, 
compared  with a median off-diagonal  correlation  of .24, 
which is satisfactory.  Three measures have relatively  weak 
discriminant  validities:  integrity  as an ensemble, music 
director  organizational  initiatives,  and music director 
coaching. 
We compared  within-composite,  off-diagonal,  and 
between-composite correlations  for the 21 measures across 
countries. Patterns  of intercorrelations  were quite similar 
across nations,  which provides  assurance about the 
comparability  of players'  responses to the English  and 
German  versions of the instrument  and permits use of the 
same composite scores for all countries (Allmendinger  et al., 
1993). 
Finally,  we computed intraclass  correlations  across 
orchestras for all survey variables  for which players 
described their orchestra  and leaders. All of these 
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the responses of players  within orchestras to generate 
organization-level  scores for each of these variables  (Kenny 
and LaVoie,  1985). 
Supplementary Data 
We collected survey data from East German  players 
between January  and May 1990, which was after the Berlin 
Wall  had been breached  but before formal  reunification  of 
the two Germanies.  Because it was becoming evident that 
reunification  threatened  the survival  of some orchestras we 
were studying (Allmendinger,  1990; Allmendinger  and 
Hackman,  1991), we collected three sets  of additional  data 
to track  empirically  what was happening. 
First,  we sent a semistructured  questionnaire  to the senior 
managers of all 76 orchestras in East Germany  in June 1991, 
asking them what had changed and what had remained  the 
same for their orchestras.  Twenty-two managers (29 
percent) returned  completed questionnaires.  Second, 
musicians  who had been sent player  surveys in 1990 were 
contacted again in May-and  June 1991 and asked if they 
would be willing  to (a) retake  the same survey and (b) 
complete a brief  supplementary  instrument  that asked 
specifically  about any recent changes in their orchestras. Of 
the 90 musicians  who returned  these materials,  there were 
65 matched pairs  (72 percent)  who responded in both 1990 
and 1991. With  these data we were able to do a 
comparative  analysis of the 1990 and 1991 data using 
players  as their own controls. Finally,  we sent the player 
survey to an additional  300 musicians  who had not 
participated  in the 1990 survey, following  the same sampling 
plan  that was used for second-round  data collection in the 
other countries.  We received usable responses from 158 
players (53 percent). 
RESULTS  1:  CONTEXTUAL  CHANGES 
The historical  and archival  data reported  in this section 
address our first research  question-namely,  the degree to 
which East German  symphony orchestras were buffered 
from the full impact  of the national-level  political  and 
economic changes that occurred  after World  War 11  and then 
again in the late 1980s. 
The Making of a Socialist Cultural  Environment: 
1945-1990 
The socialist regime took power in East Germany  in 1945. 
Subsequently,  the borders  of the country  were closed, the 
state assumed control  over virtually  all aspects of society, 
and there was a sharp break  from previous political, 
economic, and cultural  policies. The German  states (Lander), 
which had provided  the financial  support  for symphony 
orchestras,  were abolished in 1952. Churches  were 
disenfranchised  and no longer provided  venues for musical 
performances.  By the mid-1  950s, both the financial  support 
and the control  of symphony orchestras  were firmly  in the 
hands of the central  government. 
Cultural  policy. One tenet of state cultural  policy  was to 
bring  the German  musical  tradition  to all the people of the 
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land (Mehner,  1990). Before the socialist regime came to 
power, there were 48 orchestras in the geographical  area 
that was to become the East German  state. By 1990, East 
Germany  had 76 professional  symphony orchestras in a 
country  slightly  smaller  than the state of Tennessee. There 
was one symphony  orchestra  in East Germany  for every 
220,000 citizens, a higher  density than in any other country 
in the world (Allmendinger  and Hackman,  1994). 
Not all orchestras  were created equal, however. Although 
state policy  explicitly  promoted  the democratization  of 
culture,  its implementation  resulted in a few world-class 
ensembles, designated "Class A" orchestras, scattered 
among a much larger  number  of "B" and "C" class 
orchestras.  The higher  the class, the more fixed positions, 
the larger  the annual  budget, and the higher  the pay of 
players.  Orchestras  could not improve  their standing, nor 
was there any real risk  of demotion to a lower class. 
The state policy  of democratizing  culture  went far beyond 
simply creating  more orchestras. Many  orchestras were 
required  to travel  to communities  that did not have their 
own, to perform  in schools, and to hold concerts in industrial 
complexes (Kombinate).  Moreover,  "cultural  brigades"  were 
created as an incentive  for cultural  participation.  Members of 
these self-composed groups engaged in activities consistent 
with state ideology, including  attending  concerts and other 
cultural  events, and were rewarded  with salary  increases. 
State policy  oriented  orchestras  almost exclusively toward 
East German  audiences. Few orchestras  were allowed to 
travel  outside the country  or to produce recordings  for 
international  distribution.  The government did, however, 
make sure that the country's  very best orchestras received 
international  exposure, which further  elaborated  the status 
hierarchy  among orchestras. 
The socialist regime closed all but four of the nation's 
conservatories,  which severely limited  the supply of 
orchestra  players  and kept orchestra  size small-a  mean of 
63 players  compared  with 76 in West Germany.  Highly 
qualified  musicians  were in especially short supply because 
state policy required  that conservatories  give preference to 
applicants  from working-class  backgrounds  rather  than 
admit students strictly  on the basis of talent. Over time, 
musician  shortages became so serious that orchestras 
began to import  players  from other socialist states. 
Eventually,  even the tradition  in German  orchestras of 
all-male  players  was breached,  and women were recruited 
(Allmendinger  and Hackman,  1995). Even so, lower-class 
orchestras  often needed to borrow  players  from one another 
to cover all the parts of large-ensemble  works. 
Control of orchestras. Central  planners  exercised almost 
complete control  over the administration  and economics of 
East German  orchestras. Orchestra  names, the composition 
of their audiences, and even the size of their audiences all 
were centrally  determined.  Communist  party  officials  were 
given subscriptions,  for example, whether they wanted them 
or not. And they were counted as attending  the concerts to 
which they had been subscribed,  whether they were actually 
there or not. 
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state agencies controlled  orchestra  activities. In 1986, these 
agencies were merged into the DTO,  which assumed 
responsibility  for all aspects of orchestra  operations, 
including  artistic  policy,  personnel matters, and the 
management of support  staff. The centrality  of the DTO  to 
the day-to-day  operations  of orchestras is illustrated  by the 
player  selection process. DTO  officials  auditioned  all 
graduates  of the four music schools and assigned each one 
a technical proficiency  score. Orchestras  were allowed to 
consider only musicians  whose scores fell within a 
DTO-specified  range.  The top-ranked  orchestras auditioned 
and employed the highest-scoring  players; lower-ranked 
orchestras  were permitted  to consider only players  who had 
received lower scores-if  any players  at all were available. 
Because the wage and price structure  of the cultural  sector 
of the economy was artificially  stabilized,  East German 
orchestras  were protected from international  competition 
and from economic uncertainty.  The pay of orchestra 
musicians, however, was quite low relative  to player  salaries 
in other nations. For  example, in 1990 a musician in a 
top-ranked  East German  orchestra,  such as the Berliner 
Sinfonie  Orchester,  earned 1,800 marks  (roughly  $1200) per 
month, plus a number  of state-supplied  goods and services; 
a typical  player  in the Berliner  Philharmonisches  Orchester, a 
top West German  orchestra  just across the wall, earned 
more than four times as much. The wage structure  within 
East German  orchestras  was flat as well. Whereas principal 
players  in Western orchestras  typically  earn substantially 
more than do tutti (section) players,  all members of a section 
were paid nearly  the same in East German  orchestras. 
Orchestras'  expense budgets were centrally  determined and 
rarely  changed from year to year. Overall  budgets were 
partitioned  into funds for specific purposes, and orchestra 
managers had almost no flexibility  in using those funds. An 
orchestra  with money in its instrument  fund, for example, 
rarely  could purchase instruments  manufactured  in East 
Germany  because almost all of them were sold to other 
nations  for hard  currency.  By contrast,  funds for instrument 
repair  were relatively  easy to spend, prompting  orchestras to 
repair  even instruments  that could have been more 
inexpensively  replaced. 
The East German  policy  of "bringing  music to the people" 
was not mere propaganda;  the socialist musical culture  did 
result in East German  citizens having  greater access  to 
serious music. In implementing  this policy,  the government 
took control  of virtually  all decisions that were consequential 
for orchestras and players. Mid-range  government agencies, 
such as the DTO,  did not buffer  orchestras from national 
policies. The opposite happened: With a few exceptions, 
such as the slow application  to orchestras of national 
policies about women's employment and the relatively 
greater latitude  enjoyed by a few of the country's  finest 
orchestras,  these agencies vigorously  enforced national 
cultural  policy  for all orchestras in the land.  The result was 
high differentiation  among the three classes of orchestras, 
little  differentiation  and greater  interdependence  among 
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orchestras  within  the lower classes, and a sharp reduction  in 
autonomy  and managerial  expertise at the orchestra level. 
The Disintegration of the Socialist Cultural  Context: 
1990-1991 
With reunification,  much that had been done after the 
socialist regime took power in 1945 was immediately 
undone. The border  between East and West Germany  was 
abolished,  five new federal states were created or 
reconstituted,  churches were re-legitimized,  and the 
Kombinate  were closed. 
Cultural  policy. The Unification  Treaty  between the two 
German  nations signed in August 1990 required  that 
unification  do no damage to the cultural  infrastructure  or to 
the cultural  traditions  of the former East Germany  (Article 
35, Paragraph  6). Yet the means by which that policy  would 
be implemented-for operas, theaters, and museums as 
well as for orchestras-was  not specified. 
Policymakers  initially  attended almost exclusively to the 
financial  resources needed to ensure the survival  of East 
German  cultural  institutions.  The nation  had been spending 
246 marks  per citizen per year to support  culture; by 
contrast,  West Germany  was spending only 150 marks per 
person for culture  (estimates from the 1988 Conference of 
the Ministers  of Culture  in West Germany).  Moreover, 
financial  responsibility  for orchestras  was differently  situated 
in the two countries: Funds  were supplied mainly  by state 
and local agencies in West Germany  but by the federal 
government in East Germany. 
These differences between the two countries did not bode 
well for East German  orchestras (Allmendinger,  1990; 
Zimmer,  1990; M6ller,  1991). Not only might central  funding 
be lost, but the precarious  finances of the cities and the new 
states in the former East Germany  made it extremely 
unlikely  that they could take up the slack. The Bonn 
government  did establish a transitional  plan  that provided 
some federal  funds for East German  orchestras and gave 
each player  a pay raise of 200 marks  per month. In addition, 
the newly created states were given some funds to support 
culture,  and a few cities were able to provide  limited  support 
for their own cultural  institutions. 
The collective impact  of these programs  was a modest 
increase in resources for East German  orchestras-and 
considerable  confusion throughout  the country  about the 
amount, purposes, and conditions  of those resources. The 
federal  transitional  funds, for example, were intended merely 
to help orchestras survive  the period  of change, during 
which a number  of smaller  orchestras  were expected to 
merge. But many East German  orchestra  players  and 
managers mistakenly  viewed the funds as signaling  the 
beginning  of a period  of relative  affluence. 
Control of orchestras. By the end of 1990, East German 
regulatory  agencies such as the DTO  had ceased to function, 
and the government no longer had the capability  to control 
the nation's  symphony orchestras.  Although  none were 
closed (the government  did not have the capability  to do that 
either),  the new and unfamiliar  political-economic  context 
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fewer places for orchestras  to perform.  The closing of the 
Kombinate  had eliminated  one regular  venue, many of the 
community  halls  where smaller  orchestras had performed 
were no longer  available  to them, and as Gymnasia 
deemphasized cultural  activities,  they stopped inviting 
orchestras  to perform  for students. Although  corporate 
sponsors appeared  on the East German  orchestral  scene  for 
the first time ever, they had little  immediate impact on either 
finances or performance  opportunities. 
Economic  realities  required  that ticket prices be raised, even 
as people's ability  to afford  them was dropping.  Moreover, 
public  officials  no longer  were obligated  to attend orchestra 
concerts. The result  was audiences that were both smaller 
(our  data show a 30-percent  drop in occupied seats between 
1985 and 1991) and differently  composed than those to 
which musicians had become accustomed. 
As the situation  worsened, some top players  departed for 
better-paying  orchestras in the West, raising  the specter of 
competition  among orchestras  for players-something  that 
had not happened  since the socialist regime took power in 
the 1940s. With  the borders  of the country  now open, there 
was an abundance  of new players  available  to fill vacancies, 
but orchestras had neither  the know-how nor the 
wherewithal  to screen these applicants  and select among 
them. 
The societal-level  changes that occurred  in 1990, like those 
of the late 1940s, resulted in direct  and consequential 
alterations  of the proximal  environment  of East German 
orchestras.  The previously  secure base of resources to 
support  symphonic  music vanished, even as the collapse of 
the DTO  dramatically  increased orchestras'  autonomy over 
their own affairs.  But four decades of central  control  had 
been competence-destroying  rather  than competence- 
enhancing  for East German  orchestras (Tushman  and 
Anderson, 1986). Few of them had the expertise needed 
either to solve the problems  or to exploit the opportunities 
that accompanied  the revolutionary  events of 1990. 
Conclusion 
The answer to our first research  question-about  whether 
mid-range  government  agencies buffered East German 
symphony orchestras  from the two national-level 
changes-is  clearly  negative. In  the first instance, high-level 
decision makers eliminated  some entities that had been 
important  features of the orchestral  context (such as 
churches)  and created new agencies that became highly 
salient for orchestras (such as the DTO  and the Kombinate). 
The mid-range  government  agencies that remained  in place, 
such as municipalities,  potentially  could have buffered 
orchestras  from the full impact  of these changes, but they 
did not. In  the second instance, the collapse of the 
government rendered  financially  and administratively 
impotent  the very institutions  that had become the most 
consequential  features of the orchestral  context under 
socialsm. 
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The contextual  changes were real  jolts. They were neither 
invented by orchestras (Starbuck,  1976: 1069) nor merely 
enacted by them (Weick,  1993: 372-373). Nor  were they 
gradual  adjustments  that organizational  actors perceived as 
discontinuous  only retrospectively  (Lenz  and Engledow, 
1986: 343-344). That  symphony orchestras in East Germany 
were part  of a longstanding  and widely valued cultural 
institution  afforded  them virtually  no protection  from the 
profound  changes that took place at the center of the 
national  government. 
RESULTS  11:  ORCHESTRAS  AND PLAYERS 
To address our second research question, we turn  from 
contextual  analysis to an examination  of East German 
orchestras  as organizations.  How did orchestra  operations 
and the life and work of orchestra  players  change in 
response to the two national-level  political-economic 
changes? 
The Impact of the Socialist Context on Orchestras and 
Players: 1945-1990 
Although  longitudinal  data are not available  for East German 
orchestras  for the 1945-1990 period,  certain  within-  and 
between-country  comparisons  using 1990 data can be used 
to assess  the impact  of the socialist context on orchestras 
and their members. It was clear in 1990 that significant 
political  changes were on the horizon,  but little had actually 
changed yet. The survey and observational  data collected 
that year therefore provide  a reasonable  depiction  of East 
German  orchestras  at the very end of the socialist regime. 
Three comparisons  inform  our research question. The first is 
within  the German  cultural  tradition:  East vs. West German 
orchestras.  The second is between traditions:  the two 
German  states vs. the United  States and the United 
Kingdom.  And the third  is within nation: major  vs. regional 
orchestras. If differences between the two German  states 
(the within-tradition  comparison)  are more substantial  than 
those between traditions  and within nations, that would 
suggest that the contextual  changes instituted  by the 
socialist regime did alter  the functioning  of orchestras as 
organizations.  If the differences between the two German 
states are smaller in magnitude  than either the 
between-tradition  or the within-nation  comparisons, 
however, that would suggest that the changes in the East 
German  political-economic  context had relatively  little effect 
on orchestras and their players. 
Cross-national  differences were analyzed  using the SAS 
General  Linear  Models program.  We first computed 
orchestra  means using the 1990 survey data. These means 
were then analyzed  in a model that included  terms for 
country,  standing  (major  vs. regional  orchestras),  country  by 
standing,  and specific orchestra  nested within standing. 
Orchestra  was treated as a random  effect, and the error 
term for testing the effect of standing  was adjusted 
accordingly. 
Findings  are shown in Table  3. East vs. West German 
comparisons,  on average, control  far less variance  than do 
either (a) comparisons  of the two German  nations, taken 
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Sources of Variation: Orchestra Standing, German-German,  and International  Comparisons* 
Percent variance controlled 
East vs.  East + West Germany  Major  vs. 
Measure  West Germany  vs. USA + UK  regional orchestras 
Organizational  features of the orchestra 
Integrity  as an ensemble  0%  19%  11% 
Orchestra  structure:  Task  and composition  8%  0%  16% 
Player  involvement  and opportunities  5%  16%  8% 
Adequacy  of resources  8%  0%  8% 
Single items: 
Recognition  (Excellent  playing  pays off)  1%  19%  26% 
Recruitment  (Fair  and effective)  0%  11%  5% 
Orchestral  process and performance 
Quality  of internal  processes  6%  0%  17% 
Musical  outcomes  0%  13%  0% 
Single items: 
Finances  (Getting  stronger  financially)  3%  38%  0% 
Stability  (Organization  not falling  apart)  0%  8%  14% 
Player  motivation  and satisfaction 
General  satisfaction  0%  33%  4% 
Internal  work motivation  17%  8%  0% 
Job involvement  6%  61%  0% 
Satisfaction  with: 
Compensation  27%  0%  11% 
Job security  5%  2%  12% 
Management  0%  16%  2% 
Work  relationships  10%  4%  6% 
Growth  opportunities  4%  7%  4% 
* Based on planned  contrasts  of an analysis  involving  the main  and interactive  effects of country,  standing  (major  vs. 
regional),  and orchestra.  N =  72 orchestras. 
together, with the United  States and United Kingdom  or (b) 
comparisons  of major  vs. regional  orchestras within 
countries.  The East vs. West German  comparison  controls 
more than 10 percent of the variance  for only two of our 18 
measures: internal  work motivation  and satisfaction  with 
compensation.  These findings  are confirmed  by a profile 
analysis of the country  means for our ten measures of 
organizational  features and orchestral  processes. The 
D-squared  index of profile  similarity  (Nunnally,  1978: 443) for 
East and West German  orchestras is 1.9, compared  with an 
index of 5.6 for the means of East and West German 
orchestras  taken together relative  to the means of United 
States and United Kingdom  orchestras  taken together (the 
lower the index, the greater  the profile  similarity). 
The substantive differences between East German 
orchestras  and those in the other three countries in the 
sample are shown in Table  4. Overall,  East German  players 
reported  that their orchestras  were, under  socialism, 
relatively  well structured  and stable as organizations,  a 
finding  that is generally  consistent with our observational 
and archival  data (Allmendinger  and Hackman,  1994). 
Relationships  among East German  players  were more 
positive than acrimonious,  and player  motivation, 
satisfaction,  and job involvement  were quite high. At the 
same time, resources were insufficient,  players  were 
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Table 4 
Cross-national  Comparison  of Measures  from  the  Player Survey* 
East  West  United  United 
Measure  Germany  Germany  States  Kingdom  F-ratio  p 
Organizational features  of the  orchestra 
Integrity as an ensemble  5.34  5.23  4.67  4.68  8.73  .001 
Orchestra structure: Task and composition  5.03  4.60  4.74  4.75  3.28  .030 
Player involvement  and opportunities  4.33  4.02  3.97  3.44  7.25  .001 
Adequacy  of resources  3.56  4.58  4.80  3.76  5.44  .003 
Single  items: 
Recognition  (Excellent playing pays off)  5.68  5.77  5.04  5.07  9.35  .001 
Recruitment (Fair  and effective)  5.51  5.53  5.06  4.81  3.59  .020 
Orchestral process  and performance 
Quality of internal processes  4.78  4.42  4.79  4.62  2.68  .060 
Musical outcomes  4.61  4.50  4.96  5.26  4.17  .010 
Single  items: 
Finances  (Getting stronger financially)  2.11  2.81  4.48  4.15  19.36  .001 
Stability (Organization not falling apart)  5.98  6.09  5.88  5.46  2.31  .090 
Player motivation and satisfaction 
General satisfaction  5.87  5.80  5.38  4.83  15.70  .001 
Internal work motivation  6.45  6.05  6.14  5.96  9.15  .001 
Job  involvement  6.30  5.19  3.24  3.33  139.81  .001 
Satisfaction  with: 
Compensation  3.03  4.84  4.14  3.81  19.54  .001 
Job security  4.15  5.03  5.14  4.77  5.44  .003 
Management  4.36  4.45  4.24  3.51  6.39  .001 
Work relationships  4.95  4.68  4.95  5.00  3.26  .030 
Growth opportunities  5.00  4.73  4.85  4.29  5.84  .002 
* Country means  are the average  of the  means  of individual orchestras.  N =  72 orchestras. 
concerned that their orchestras  were slipping  musically  and 
financially,  and there was pervasive unhappiness  with pay 
and job security. 
The political-economic  system within  which East German 
orchestras operated  from 1945 to 1990 did affect orchestra 
operations  and player  motivation  and satisfaction.  Yet the 
size of these effects is modest for most measures. Clearly, 
the musical  and organizational  traditions  of East German 
orchestras  were not destroyed by the 45 years of socialist 
rule. 
Orchestras  in West Germany  also were changing  between 
1945 and 1990-but  in the opposite direction,  which should 
have increased  the size of obtained  differences between the 
two nations.  Although  West German  orchestras continued to 
be supported  mainly  by the Lander  and the cities, the 
national  economic context in which they operated became 
increasingly  capitalist  and market  oriented. Moreover, 
satisfactory  concert halls  were available  to all West German 
orchestras, instruments  and music libraries  were rarely  a 
problem,  and there were both funds and opportunities  for 
international  tours by many orchestras.  Yet these orchestras 
also did not stray  far from the continental  tradition  of a 
state-supported  musical  culture.  Overall,  our findings 
suggest that it was more consequential  in 1990 to be a 
German  orchestra  than it was to be an orchestra  in a 
socialist nation. 
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To examine how orchestras  and players responded to this 
second major  political-economic  change, we analyzed  data 
within  the East German  nation,  comparing  the 1990 and 
1991 responses of those players  who completed the 
research  survey both years. We excluded from this analysis 
four players  who were the only ones from their orchestras 
to respond  to both rounds  of the survey. Data for the 
remaining  61 players  were analyzed  in a general linear  model 
that included  terms for standing (major  vs. regional),  time 
(1990 vs. 1991), standing  by time, orchestra  nested within 
standing,  time by orchestra,  and individual  respondent 
nested within  orchestra.  Orchestra  and respondent were 
treated as random  effects, and error  terms were adjusted 
accordingly.  Because there were unequal  numbers of 
respondents from different  orchestras, means were first 
computed for each orchestra  and then averaged to generate 
overall  means for the two years. 
As is seen in Table 5, the trend is modestly positive. The 
1990 and 1991 means differ  significantly  for four measures, 
two of which have to do with money: In 1991, players 
reported  that their  orchestras  were getting stronger 
financially  and that they were happier  than before with their 
pay. This finding  surely reflects hope as well as reality,  since 
the promised  transitional  funds for orchestras had not yet 
arrived  when the 1991 survey was administered.  Apparently, 
players'  anticipation  of those funds-coupled  with the token 
pay increase they had received-sufficed  to alter their 
perception  of and their satisfaction  with orchestra  finances. 
Players  in 1991 also reported  that they now had heightened 
involvement  in their organizations  and expanded 
opportunities  for influence  and mobility.  This is consistent 
with the movement, observed in many orchestras, for 
players  to take the reins of leadership  from those 
state-appointed  officials  who previously  had held them. 
Finally,  players reported  that their orchestras had improved 
musically  between 1990 and 1991. Given  that attendance for 
most East German  orchestras  was dropping  sharply  in the 
early  months of 1991, this finding  is unexpected. Yet the 
people who now were attending  concerts were more overtly 
appreciative  than they had been before-they  were, after all, 
there because they wanted to be rather  than because they 
were expected to be. Given  musicians'  attentiveness to the 
reactions  of their  audiences, this may have been enough to 
engender a perception  that their orchestras were, in fact, 
improving  musically. 
Conclusion 
East German  orchestras exhibited remarkable  stability  and 
continuity  with their  traditions  despite two radical  changes in 
the country's  political-economic  system. This finding 
provides  additional  evidence of the power of institutional 
processes to foster continuity  even under  conditions  of 
revolutionary  change (Skocpol,  1976). The answer to our 
second research  question, then, is that the two major 
political-economic  changes only modestly affected orchestral 
functioning  and the life and work of players. 
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Table 5 
Comparison  of  East  German  Players'  Responses  in 1990  and  1991* 
Main effects  Time  by 
for time  standing  interactions 
Measure  1990  1991  F-ratio  F-ratio 
Organizational features  of the  orchestra 
Integrity as an ensemble  5.28  5.30  0.03  4.40- 
Orchestra structure: Task and composition  5.05  4.95  0.71  0.01 
Player involvement  and opportunities  4.33  4.50  4.08-  10.17-- 
Adequacy  of resources  3.86  4.08  2.07  1.92 
Single  items: 
Recognition  (Excellent playing pays off)  5.56  5.68  0.57  4.12- 
Recruitment (Fair  and effective)  5.48  5.57  0.57  3.91 
Orchestral process  and performance 
Quality of internal processes  4.68  4.77  0.96  0.92 
Musical outcomes  4.29  4.59  5.76-  1.89 
Single  items: 
Finances  (Getting stronger financially)  2.25  3.29  21.37--  0.15 
Stability (Organization not falling apart)  5.87  5.80  0.16  0.01 
Player motivation and satisfaction 
General satisfaction  5.72  5.84  1.58  0.61 
Internal work motivation  6.38  6.22  3.40  0.05 
Job involvement  6.10  6.11  0.02  1.43 
Satisfaction  with: 
Compensation  2.88  3.56  13.91--  0.16 
Job security  4.25  4.57  1.69  1.56 
Management  4.26  4.54  2.05  0.46 
Work relationships  4.93  4.87  0.36  0.53 
Growth opportunities  4.91  4.96  0.05  0.17 
p <  .05;  *-p <  .01. 
*  The 1990 and 1991 means  are the averages  of the means of individual  orchestras.  N =  61 players, each at two  points 
in time.  Means  for significant interactions between  time  (1990 vs.  1991) and orchestra standing (major vs.  regional) 
are presented  in Figure 1. 
The homogeneity that was observed during  the socialist 
period  was overdetermined.  Beyond institutional  forces, the 
pervasive  administrative  and economic control  of orchestras 
made it virtually  impossible for any but a very few 
international  "showcase" ensembles to chart  their own 
futures or to differentiate  themselves from others in their 
state-specified class. When the socialist regime and its 
regulatory  agencies collapsed in 1990, orchestras' latitude  to 
manage themselves increased dramatically,  even as their 
financial  security  disappeared.  Our  data show a modest 
overall  improvement  in orchestra  functioning  during  this 
period  (Table  5). But we also found that some orchestras 
were adapting  much more successfully to their new 
opportunities  and challenges than were others. We turn next 
to analysis of the reasons why. 
RESULTS  III:  ADAPTATION  PROCESSES 
We address our third  research  question by drawing  on 
survey, interview,  and observational  data to identify  the 
factors that distinguish  those East German  orchestras that 
fared relatively  well under reunification  from those whose 
survival  became increasingly  uncertain.  Our  field 
observations  pointed  to two factors, one structural  and one 
behavioral,  as likely  moderators  of orchestras' 
post-reunification  well-being: (a) an orchestra's prior  standing 
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kinds  of leadership  initiatives  taken by orchestra leaders and 
players.  We examine these two moderators  separately and 
then show how their  joint  effects set in motion, for some 
orchestras, self-fueling  spirals  of increasing  (or decreasing) 
viability. 
Orchestra Standing 
The political-economic  events of 1990-1991 had quite 
different  consequences for major  and regional  orchestras. As 
is seen in Figure  1 and Table  5, all statistically  reliable 
interactions  between time and standing have to do with the 
orchestras'  organizational  features, and four of the five carry 
the same message: that higher-standing  orchestras were 
getting stronger  and lower-standing  orchestras were getting 
weaker as the events of reunification  unfolded.  This pattern 
is found for integrity  as an ensemble, for player  involvement 
and opportunities,  for performance-contingent  recognition, 
and for fair  and effective recruitment  processes.  It is 
noteworthy  that the measures for which the gap between 
major  and regional  orchestras widened are those for which, 
in 1990, East German  means were relatively  high (Table  4). 
This suggests that reunification  of the German  state risked 
Figure 1. Significant time by standing (major vs. regional) interactions: 
East German orchestras. 
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compromising  some of the special strengths of the many 
smaller  orchestras  that had been dispersed so densely 
throughout  the nation. 
Leader  Initiatives 
We measured three aspects of music director  behavior: 
direction-setting,  taking  organizational  initiatives,  and 
coaching (see the Appendix  for the specific behaviors 
assessed). The significant  time-by-standing  interaction  found 
for music director  organizational  initiatives  exhibits a pattern 
complementary  to that of the other significant  interactions 
shown in Figure  1. In 1990, the music directors  of regional 
orchestras  were taking  more initiatives  to improve  the 
structure  and functioning  of their orchestras than were their 
counterparts  in major  orchestras.  A year later, however, 
those differences had disappeared.  Conductors  of regional 
orchestras  were giving less attention  to organizational 
matters than they had before, and those of major  orchestras 
were making  more organizational  changes than previously,  a 
pattern  consistent both with the widening gap between 
major  and regional  orchestras on other measures and with 
our on-site observations. 
To further  analyze how leader behavior  moderated the 
impact  of reunification,  we calculated  the difference in the 
level of organizational  initiatives  taken by music directors 
between 1990 and 1991, using data from players  who 
described their leaders both years, and then correlated  that 
difference  with our dependent measures. Results are shown 
in Table  6. 
Table 6 
Correlations  between  Change  in Music  Director  Organizational  Initiatives  and  Orchestra-  and 
Player-level  Measures* 
Measure  Player-level  data  (N =  65)  Orchestra-level  data  (N =  20) 
Organizational features  of the  orchestra 
Integrity as  an ensemble  .24-  .11 
Orchestra structure: Task and composition  .20  .12 
Player involvement  and opportunities  .29--  .66--- 
Adequacy  of resources  -.04  -  .16 
Single  items: 
Recognition  (Excellent playing pays off)  .20  .34 
Recruitment (Fair  and effective)  .26-  .30 
Sections  (Are a key organizational feature)  -.24  -.16 
Orchestral processes  and outcomes  (no significant correlations) 
Player motivation and satisfaction 
General satisfaction  .28--  .23 
Internal work motivation  .08  .09 
Job involvement  .08  .11 
Satisfaction with: 
Compensation  .12  .45-- 
Job security  .20  .23 
Management  .44---  .66--- 
Work relationships  .27-  .43- 
Growth opportunities  .31  .42- 
-p  <  .10;  *-p <  .05;  *-p  <  .01. 
* Player-level correlations were  computed  using data from the  65  players who  completed  surveys  both in 1990  and 
1991; orchestra-level  correlations  were computed  using  average  player  scores for  each of the 20 orchestras  for  which 
data were available  both  years. 
357/ASQ, September 1996 Increased  organizational  initiatives  by music directors  were 
associated with improvements  in several organizational 
features: greater player  involvement  and opportunities, 
improved  recruitment  processes, and greater integrity  of the 
orchestra  as a musical  ensemble. Change in conductor 
initiatives  was negatively  associated with the centrality  of 
sections to the orchestra's  work (ameasure not discussed 
elsewhere in this report),  suggesting that conductors' 
actions focused on consolidation  of the orchestra  as a 
whole. Significant  effects also were obtained  for player 
satisfaction  with management,  with work relationships,  and 
with growth opportunities.  These are precisely the kinds of 
affective changes that one would expect to find in an 
orchestra  in which the music director  had expanded players' 
opportunities,  improved  recruitment  processes, and 
strengthened the orchestra  as an ensemble-as  the music 
directors  of these orchestras had done. 
The measures that did not covary  with music director 
organizational  initiatives  also are informative:  orchestra  task 
and composition,  adequacy  of resources, work motivation 
and involvement,  and all four indicators  of orchestral 
processes and performance.  The data reported  in Table 6, 
although  correlational  and therefore open to alternative 
interpretations,  do suggest that when conductors responded 
to the events of reunification  by focussing their energies on 
aspects of the organization  over which they had direct and 
immediate  control,  players  subsequently expressed greater 
satisfaction  about those same matters-but  not about 
others. 
Change of Leadership 
Six of the 21 orchestras in our sample changed music 
directors  between 1990 and 1991, and seven of them 
changed technical  directors.  How did these orchestras fare 
relative  to those whose former  leaders remained  in place? 
As shown in Table  7, orchestras  that changed music 
directors  scored significantly  lower on three indicators  of 
financial  and organizational  well-being  than did orchestras 
that did not change conductors;  orchestras that changed 
technical  directors  scored lower on almost all of the 
measures having  to do with organizational  design. 
It is tempting to conclude from these findings  that replacing 
leaders during  a period  of radical  environmental  change 
invites disaster-an  interpretation  that would fit well with 
the population  ecology perspective on organizational  change 
(Hannan  and Freeman,  1984). In  this case, however, the 
opposite conclusion is more tenable. Our  observational  data 
show that orchestras in which leadership  changes were 
made (often at the initiative  of players,  who hoped that new 
leaders would make things better)  were those that had been 
in especially poor shape as organizations  prior  to 
reunification.  Although  it no doubt is true that leader 
behavior  makes more of a difference during  major 
organizational  reorientations  than during  periods of stability 
(Tushman  and Romanelli,  1985), the improvements East 
German  players  hoped for, if ever they were to come, were 
not yet evident when we collected follow-up  data on their 
orchestras in 1991. 
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Table  7 
Comparison of Orchestras That Did and Did Not Change Leaders 
between  1990 and 1991 
Measure  Yes  No  t 
Music director replaced 
Adequacy  of resources  2.86  4.12  -2.29-- 
Stability  (Organization  not falling  apart)  5.23  6.31  - 2.74--- 
Satisfaction  with job security  3.58  4.80  - 2.29-- 
N  6  15 
Technical director replaced 
Integrity  as an ensemble  5.20  5.59  -  1.75- 
Adequacy  of resources  2.96  4.05  -2.07-- 
Recognition  (Excellent  playing  pays off)  5.62  6.16  - 2.62-- 
Recruitment  (Fair  and effective)  5.13  5.82  -2.32-- 
Sections (Are  a key organizational  feature)  4.47  5.40  -2.15" 
Quality  of internal  processes  4.59  5.08  -2.15-- 
N  7  14 
*p  <  .10; *-p <  .05;  seep  <  .01. 
Player  Initiatives 
To further explore the  role of players in shaping the 
post-reunification prospects  of East German orchestras,  we 
turned to our observational data to identify eight orchestras 
in which  players took significant leadership initiatives 
between  1990 and 1991. As shown  in Table 8, those  eight 
orchestras  were  significantly lower on many of our 
measures  than were  the thirteen orchestras  in which  players 
did not take organizational initiatives. This finding adds 
credence  to the  interpretation that players more often  take 
action in orchestras  with serious  problems than in those  that 
are in relatively good  shape.  And it is organizational 
difficulties that are especially  likely to incite players: 
Orchestras in which  players took leadership initiatives scored 
significantly lower on six of our seven  measures  of 
organizational features,  but on only three of the twelve 
measures  in other domains. 
That the consequences  of players taking control of their 
orchestras  varied from orchestra to orchestra  is illustrated by 
the following two  cases.  In a middle-size ensemble  near a 
large city, players fired their music director just as  soon  as 
the collapsing political system  made  it possible  to do so.  As 
a replacement,  they chose  a very young  conductor 
experienced  in the ways  of Western  orchestras.  They gave 
him a short-term contract, keeping other candidates  on hold, 
so  they could assess  his performance before  confirming the 
appointment-which,  after a year and a half, they  did. At this 
writing, the  new  music director is firmly in control and the 
orchestra is prospering. 
Players in another orchestra,  located  in a small community 
near a resort area, were  less  successful.  With the 
cooperation of the town  mayor, who  wanted  a fine orchestra 
that would draw tourists and thereby  help the  local 
economy, they fired both the music director  and the 
technical  director.  A famous conductor  from another country 
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Comparison of Orchestras in Which Players Did and Did Not Take Leadership  Initiatives 
Player leadership initiatives 
Measure  Yes (N = 8)  No (N =  13)  t 
Organizational  features of the orchestra 
Integrity as an ensemble  5.14  5.59  -  2.15-- 
Orchestra  structure:  Task  and composition  4.55  5.22  -2.55-- 
Player  involvement  and opportunities  4.21  4.70  -2.77--- 
Adequacy  of resources  2.95  4.16  -2.30-- 
Single items: 
Recognition  (Excellent  playing  pays off)  5.77  6.08  -  1.36 
Recruitment  (Fair  and effective)  5.24  5.76  -  1.76- 
Sections (Are  a key organizational  feature)  4.43  5.41  -2.42-- 
Orchestral  processes and outcomes 
Quality  of internal  processes  4.49  5.10  -2.51-- 
Musical outcomes  4.86  4.73  0.36 
Single items: 
Finances  (Getting  stronger  financially)  2.99  2.95  0.09 
Stability  (Organization  not falling  apart)  5.25  6.38  -  2.45-- 
Respondent  motivation  and satisfaction 
General satisfaction  5.68  6.07  -0.92 
Internal  work motivation  6.37  6.37  -0.02 
Job involvement  6.15  6.08  0.41 
Satisfaction  with: 
Compensation  3.46  3.71  -  0.55 
Job security  3.67  4.85  -2.30-- 
Management  4.22  4.78  -1.30 
Work relationships  4.88  4.88  0.01 
Growth opportunities  4.66  5.02  -0.97 
*p < .10;  s-p  <  .05;  U*p <  .01. 
was hired  who, together with the new technical director, 
decided to radically  reduce the orchestra's size. That 
decision was poorly  received by players  and the 
already-shaky  situation  of the orchestra  deteriorated  even 
further.  Perhaps  the new leaders' decisions will turn  out to 
promote the long-term  best interest of the community,  the 
orchestra,  and the players.  The short-term  consequences, 
however, were described by players-whose  actions had set 
the change process in motion-as  decidedly negative. 
Conclusion 
Our  findings  point  to a significant  difference in the ability  of 
major  and regional  orchestras to adapt to the challenges and 
opportunities  posed by reunification.  Major  orchestras, which 
were already  relatively  strong and well financed, became 
even more so, giving  them influence  and opportunities  that 
in other countries  are accorded only to a few "star" 
orchestras. Regional  orchestras continued  to exist, but they 
risked  losing their special prestige as the orchestras of the 
people, along with many of the material  resources they 
needed to accomplish  their musical  work. 
Orchestra  leadership  also clearly  moderated  the impact of 
reunification  on East German  orchestras, in two contrasting 
ways. On the one hand, leadership  initiatives  by music 
directors  that addressed organizational  features of orchestras 
were associated with favorable  player  reports  about both 
orchestra  properties  and their own satisfaction.  These 
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findings,  although  correlational,  support  the proposition  that 
competent leadership  can significantly  help organizations 
adapt  to exogenous shocks. On the other hand, leadership 
initiatives  by players-which often included  replacement of 
existing leaders with others of their own choosing-occurred 
mainly  in orchestras  that already  were troubled-and such 
initiatives  were by no means certain  to improve  either 
orchestra  health  or player  well-being. 
How are these two findings  to be reconciled?  We 
hypothesize  that the degree to which leadership  initiatives 
are helpful  to an organization  in responding  to an 
environmental  shock depends on the prior  health of the 
organization  as a social system. When a shock hits an 
organization  that is already  strong, members are unlikely 
either to replace  their leaders or to take significant 
leadership  initiatives  themselves. In  this case, competent 
leadership  (indexed  here as increased organizational 
initiatives  by existing leaders)  is likely  to aid adaptation  to the 
exogenous event (Table  6). The situation  is reversed, 
however, when a shock hits an organization  that already  is 
dysfunctional.  Members of such organizations  are more 
likely  to replace existing leaders and/or  to take over the 
leadership  of the enterprise  than are members of stronger 
organizations  (Tables  7 and 8). But if the organization's 
troubles  are serious, members' initiatives  are unlikely  to 
accomplish  the needed repairs  and, perversely, may even 
make things worse. This state of affairs,  which is akin  to 
what is seen in the United  States when employees convert 
an already-failing  business into a worker  cooperative, 
characterizes  the experience of several small and struggling 
East German  orchestras during  the reunification  years. 
Taken  together, our findings  about the moderating  effects of 
orchestra  standing  and organizational  leadership  suggest that 
as the economic context of East German  orchestras 
becomes even more market-oriented,  self-fueling 
performance  spirals  (Lindsley,  Brass, and Thomas, 1995) 
may further  widen the existing gap between major  and 
regional  orchestras in that country.  Only major  orchestras, 
for example, appear  to have material  resources and network 
contacts sufficient  to engage technical  directors  and music 
directors  of the quality  needed to see  them through  what is 
certain  to be a highly  turbulent  transition  period.  As McCann 
and Selsky (1984: 465-466) noted, hyperturbulence  can 
result in a kind  of social triage  that separates organizations 
that have adequate adaptive  capacity  from those that do not. 
The eventual outcome could be a repartitioning  of the 
population  of orchestras in the former East Germany,  from 
the three classes of orchestras created by the socialist 
government into two groups: strong orchestras occupying 
what McCann  and Selsky call "social enclaves" that 
preserve their  adaptive  capacities and weaker orchestras 
caught in downward-spiraling  "social  vortices" of suboptimal 
functioning. 
DISCUSSION  AND CONCLUSION 
Two conceptual  dimensions are helpful  in accounting  for the 
differential  impact of the 1945 and the 1991 
political-economic  changes on East German  orchestras and 
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contingencies (the degree to which the resources available 
to organizations  depend on their  actions) and (2) the impact 
of the changes on organizations'  operational  autonomy (the 
amount of latitude  organizations  have to manage their own 
affairs). 
The Advent of State Socialism 
The first change, to state socialism, simultaneously  reduced 
both resource contingency  and operational  autonomy. Prior 
to 1945, orchestras could negotiate with government agents 
about resources and, through  their actions, potentially 
improve  their standing.  This was no longer possible under 
socialism. All  orchestras  within each of the three hierarchical 
classes received roughly  equivalent  financial,  material,  and 
human  resources. There was nothing  an orchestra  could do 
to improve  its situation,  nor  was there any real risk  that its 
situation  would worsen. 
Orchestras'  operational  autonomy  also decreased sharply 
under  socialism. State agencies, rather  than orchestras, now 
controlled  most personnel matters, how financial  resources 
were to be used, where orchestras  were to perform  and for 
whom, and more. The reduction  of orchestras' autonomy 
provided  stability  and predictability.  But it also blurred  the 
boundaries  among smaller  and poorer  orchestras as they 
struggled  together to accomplish  their centrally  assigned 
tasks with fewer resources than were actually  needed to do 
so, fostering among them the kinds  of linkages  that can 
mitigate  the impact  of exogenous changes (Miner, 
Amburgey, and Stearns,  1990). 
The simultaneous reduction  of resource contingency and 
operational  autonomy under  socialism significantly 
strengthened institutional  forces for East German  orchestras. 
Consistent  with the predictions  of DiMaggio  and Powell 
(1983:  155), they became  homogeneous  within class  as 
their  transactions  with state agencies became more 
extensive and consequential  and as the number  of visible 
alternative  models decreased. Moreover,  as both the need 
and opportunity  for orchestras  to take entrepreneurial 
initiatives  declined, the historical  and cultural  traditions  that 
orchestras shared with each other became increasingly 
salient. 
The power of these institutional  forces is illustrated  by what 
happened  to the repertoire  played by East German 
orchestras under  state socialism. The official  policy of the 
state concert and theater agency was that orchestras would 
emphasize in their programs  music by contemporary 
composers from socialist countries.  Although  most people 
we interviewed  assured us that this policy had been 
implemented,  the data say otherwise. We selected one 
concert program  from each orchestra  in our sample 
(excluding  special or festival programs  and concerts led by 
guest conductors)  and recorded  the birthdates  of the 
composers whose works were played. Only  8 percent of the 
works performed  by East German  orchestras were by 
composers born  in the twentieth century,  compared  with 20 
percent  for  West Germany,  24 percent  for the United  Kingdom, 
and 32  percent for the United  States. Also informative  are 
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the median birthdates  of the composers of the works 
performed.  For  East Germany,  the median composer 
birthdate  was 1809, compared  with 1857 for West Germany, 
1862 for the United  States, and 1864 for the United 
Kingdom. 
Far  from being on the cutting  edge of contemporary  music, 
then, East German  orchestras appear  to have exhibited in 
their music an especially deep commitment to the classical 
repertoire  that was central  to their musical heritage.  This 
finding  exemplifies Carroll,  Delacroix,  and Goodstein's (1988) 
proposition  that politically  imposed cultural  systems often 
generate behavior  opposite to that which is sought. Cultural 
isomorphism  still operates in such circumstances, but "in 
the sense  that the state culture  serves as a negative 
template for the observable  organizational  culture"  (p. 373). 
The Fall of the Socialist Regime 
The second major  political-economic  change brought  a nearly 
complete reversal  of the state of affairs  just described. The 
availability  of resources became increasingly  contingent on 
orchestras'  actions, and as central  government agencies 
stopped functioning,  orchestras experienced a sudden and 
dramatic  increase in their operational  autonomy. Once again, 
orchestras had the right  and the obligation  to handle such 
matters as personnel decisions, budgets, concert venues, 
and audience relations. 
Although  these changes generated uncertainty  and threat for 
East German  orchestras,  they also invited  adaptive 
responses. Success was by no means assured, however, 
because both a proactive  orientation  and management skill 
were required,  and these were qualities  that had atrophied 
for many orchestras  during  their four decades under  state 
socialism. Our  findings  show that major  orchestras were far 
better positioned  than regional  orchestras to take advantage 
of the situation  in 1991. Both the staffing of major 
orchestras  and their recent histories contributed  to their 
ability  to respond competently  to the threats and the 
opportunities  that accompanied  reunification.  The structure 
of these orchestras more closely approximated  the 
international  standard,  and their managers generally  were 
better qualified  and more knowledgeable  than those of 
regional  orchestras. Moreover,  the top orchestras in East 
Germany  had toured internationally  and produced 
commercial  recordings,  activities  that increased their 
knowledge of the orchestral  world outside their own 
country.  When the time came to take action, therefore, 
these orchestras  were more disposed to act, and they had a 
greater  capability  to do so competently. 
The Acuity of Conceptual Lenses 
Our  findings  suggest that different  conceptual paradigms  are 
differentially  useful for examining  organization-environment 
relations,  depending  on the nature  of the environmental 
changes that are occurring  (Tolbert,  1985: 11-12; Singh, 
House, and Tucker,  1986; Hambrick  and Finkelstein,  1987; 
Gersick,  1991: 12; Meyer, Goes, and Brooks, 1993). On one 
hand,  when environmental  changes decrease both the 
degree to which resources are contingent on organizational 
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happened  to East German  orchestras after the socialist 
regime took power, then organizations  have neither  the need 
nor the capability  to take action to improve  their situations. 
Under  these conditions,  institutional  models are particularly 
useful in tracking  what happens within  and among 
organizations.  Consistent with the tenets of institutional 
theory, we saw in our data both increased homogeneity and 
reinforcement  of orchestral  heritage  and traditions  among 
East German  orchestras under  socialist rule. 
When, on the other hand,  environmental  changes increase 
both resource contingencies and operational  autonomy, then 
adaptation  models provide  especially useful analytic  lenses. 
In  our data, such models apply in the period  after the fall of 
state socialism, when there was both need for action 
(because resources became increasingly  contingent on what 
orchestras  did and did not do) and the opportunity  to take it 
(because external  agencies no longer  dictated to orchestras 
or constrained  their choices). 
Some orchestras responded  to the threat posed by 
reunification  with inaction  or even retrenchment;  others 
exhibited  proactive  and innovative  responses. Our  data show 
that the more proactive  strategy, when done with 
competence, sharply  differentiated  those orchestras that 
prospered  in the new context from those whose survival 
began to come into question. It is noteworthy  that the 
actions taken by the most successful orchestras were 
oriented  simultaneously  internally,  toward increased 
efficiency and better alignment  with the new contextual 
realities,  as would be predicted  by rational  adaptation 
models, and externally,  in securing funding  and new 
performance  venues, as would be predicted  by the resource 
dependency paradigm. 
The two historical  periods represented by our data fill  the 
diagonal  cells of a 2 x  2 matrix  defined by resource 
contingency  and operational  autonomy,  as depicted in Figure 
2. East German  orchestras  were low on both dimensions 
during  state socialism and became high on both as the 
reunification  process began to unfold.  We can speculate, as 
well, on the two off-diagonal  cells, even though our data do 
not provide  information  on them. Consider,  first, a situation 
in which environmental  changes result in high resource 
contingency  but low operational  autonomy. In such 
circumstances,  organizations  are at risk  because of high 
resource contingency,  but there is little  that leaders and 
members can do about it because of low operational 
autonomy. Ecological  models, which are pessimistic about 
the efficacy of actions by organizational  representatives,  are 
especially useful in analyzing  what happens in this cell of the 
matrix. 
Finally,  when changes result in low resource contingency but 
high operational  autonomy,  conceptual paradigms  that 
address organization-environment  relations  may be mostly 
irrelevant  to organizational  analysis. Organizational  leaders 
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Figure 2.  The  applicability  of organization-environment  models  for 
analyzing  different  types  of environmental  changes. 
CHANGE  IN RESOURCE  CONTINGENCY 
Decrease  Increase 
Institutional  Models  Ecological Models 
Decrease 
[Advent  of Socialism 
in East Germany] 
CHANGE  IN 
OPERATIONAL 
AUTONOMY 
Models of Organization-  Adaptation Models 
Environment  Relations 
Increase  Mostly Irrelevant; 
Attributional  Models  [The Fall  of the 
More Germane  Socialist Regime] 
and members can do pretty much whatever they wish, and 
neither  positive nor negative consequences will return  from 
their environments.  If resources become increasingly 
munificent,  the organization  may perform  quite well; if they 
become increasingly  scarce, it may do poorly. 
Models of attributional  processes may be more germane to 
such situations  than theories of organization-environment 
relations.  In both of the cases just described, for example, 
members may erroneously  attribute  the outcomes they 
obtain  to the actions they have taken (March,  1981; Singh, 
House, and Tucker,  1986). Such attributional  errors  can be 
dangerous.  An organization  that is inefficient  and 
overstaffed, for example, may remain  that way (or even 
grow larger  and more cumbersome) if decision makers 
erroneously  conclude that it is their actions that have 
generated the positive outcomes that are returning  from the 
munificent  but noncontingent  environment.  Similarly,  leaders 
of an organization  that is doing poorly  in a noncontingent  but 
resource-poor  environment  may initiate  organizational 
changes that accomplish  nothing  other than to create 
additional  threat  and uncertainty  within the enterprise. 
The entries in the matrix  in Figure  2 summarize  our overall 
findings  about the times and circumstances under  which 
institutional  dynamics,  ecological processes, and 
organizational  adaptation  dominate responses to significant 
societal-level  change. Taken  as a whole, the findings fit well 
with the punctuated  equilibrium  view of system change 
processes (Miller  and Friesen, 1984: chap. 8; Astley, 1985; 
Tushman  and Romanelli,  1985; Gersick,  1991). These 
theorists follow the lead of contemporary  evolutionary 
biology in viewing organizations  as generally  being in a state 
of quasi-stationary  equilibrium  that occasionally  is punctuated 
by periods of rapid,  fundamental,  and multidimensional 
change (Gould,  1980: chap. 17; 1989). Only  when the deep 
structures  of a system become dismantled,  it is argued, is 
fundamental  change likely  to occur (Gersick,  1  991  ). 
365/ASQ, September  1996 The political-economic  changes that accompanied  the advent 
of socialism in East Germany  in 1945 were, without 
question, highly  significant  for people and for institutions 
throughout  the country.  But they did not call into question 
the centuries-old  institutional  foundation  of German 
symphony  orchestras. Our  findings  suggest the opposite: 
The simultaneous reduction  of both resource contingency 
and operational  autonomy brought  by socialism actually 
strengthened institutional  forces. When the socialist regime 
fell in 1990, however, deep structures  were called into 
question. The institutional  structures  and systems to which 
orchestra  leaders and members had become well 
accustomed over the previous  four decades no longer 
operated predictably  or, in some cases,  no longer operated 
at all. Possibilities  for significant  organizational  change 
opened even as orchestra  leaders and members throughout 
the country  struggled  to make sense  of and to begin to 
respond  to the radical  new environment  in which they 
suddenly  found themselves. 
No single model of organization-environment  change can 
adequately  explain  the experiences of East German 
orchestras  during  the two periods of political-economic 
upheaval  they encountered during  the last half of this 
century.  The circumstances under  which constructive 
organizational  adaptation  is even possible are very different 
from those that condition  the success  of adaptive  activities. 
Our  findings  suggest that the possibility  of constructive 
adaptation  depends directly  on the degree to which 
environmental  changes strengthen resource contingencies 
and expand organizations'  operational  autonomy. Even then, 
only those organizations  that are already  relatively  strong and 
able to bring  competent leadership  to bear on their new 
problems  and opportunities  have a realistic  possibility  of 
adapting  successfully to the exogenous changes. 
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APPENDIX: Measures  Derived  from  the  Player  Survey 
I. Organizational  Features  of the  Orchestra 
Integrity as  an ensemble.  The degree  to which the orchestra  operates  as 
an intact, relatively stable  ensemble,  with clear and well-accepted  norms of 
behavior. (8 items) 
Orchestra  structure:  Task and  composition.  The degree  to which  the 
work of the orchestra is well-designed  (i.e., the  orchestra's  tasks  are 
challenging and feedback-rich) and the orchestra  itself is well-composed 
(i.e., players have a sufficient  level and mix of talent and experience  for their 
collective  work). (5 items) 
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Player  involvement  and  opportunities.  The degree  to which  players have 
information and influence  in the orchestra,  share in its leadership, and have 
opportunities to improve their position within it. (8 items) 
Adequacy  of  resources.  The adequacy  of the orchestra's  facilities and 
material resources.  (2 items) 
Single  items  retained: 
Recognition:  "Excellent playing pays off in this orchestra." 
Recruitment: "The orchestra's  recruitment and audition process  is fair and 
effective." 
II. Orchestral  Process  and  Performance 
Quality of  internal  processes.  The quality of the working relationships 
among  orchestra members.  (7 items) 
Musical  outcomes.  The degree  to which the  orchestra  is improving (vs. 
slipping) musically. (3 items) 
Single  items  retained: 
Finances:  "Our orchestra is getting  stronger and stronger financially." 
Stability: "As an organization, our orchestra shows  signs  of falling apart." 
(reverse-scored) 
IlI. Player  Motivation  and  Satisfaction 
General  satisfaction.  The respondent's  overall satisfaction  with  his or her 
job and work. (3 items) 
Internal work  motivation.  The degree  to which the  respondent  is 
self-motivated  to perform well  (i.e., feeling  good  when  having performed 
well and feeling  bad when  having performed poorly). (3 items) 
Job  involvement.  A single  item:  " I live, eat, and breathe  my job." 
Satisfaction  with  specific  aspects  of the  work  environment: 
Compensation  (2 items) 
Job Security (2 items) 
Management  (3 items) 
Work Relationships (3 items) 
Growth Opportunities (4 items) 
IV. Behavior  of the  Music  Director 
Direction-setting.  The degree  to which the  music director sets  a clear and 
engaging  artistic direction for the orchestra.  (5 items) 
Organizational  Initiatives.  The degree  to which the  music  director takes 
organizational initiatives (both internally, such  as  by working with 
management  to improve the organizational structure or the  recruitment 
process,  and externally, such  as  by building community  support or 
negotiating  recording contracts). (7 items) 
Coaching.  The degree  to which the  music director makes  himself  or herself 
available to orchestra members  and actively coaches  individual players and 
sections.  (5 items) 
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